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Abstract
We play a dictator game in Uganda with students, civil servants, and individuals from
the private sector. In the game, participants divide a sum of money between themselves
and a local charity. In a turning a blind eye” treatment, participants are first given the
choice of knowing the identity of the recipient. Finally, participants are asked whether
they wish to additionally donate their own money. Contrary to many experimental
findings, the average donation of non-students (civil servants) is significantly lower
than that of students. Very few individuals donate their own money, despite 30% of
participants donating the full endowment.
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1 Introduction
The growing importance of the middle class in Africa for growth, promoting good gover-
nance, and social welfare is increasingly emphasized by scholars in several disciplines. Resnick
(2015) outlines recent progress in the understanding of this issue, and calls for further inves-
tigation to deepen the understanding of the attitudes and preferences of the middle class.
This paper is a unique investigation of the charitable giving behaviour of middle class res-
idents of Kampala, Uganda: University students, civil servants, and other urban residents,
sampled in locations that are relatively expensive to visit in order to reach those at the
higher end of the income distribution. Our interest in this sub sample of the non-poor living
in developing countries stems from the belief that the social preferences and attitudes of the
middle class to poverty and charitable giving are interesting and pertinent as development
occurs. These preferences and attitudes may influence voting behaviour, occupational choice
and other labour market outcomes, and contributions to voluntary public goods, including
charitable giving, all of which have important implications for society. In Uganda, many
middle and upper class urban residents (both local and expatriate) frequent expensive cafes,
restaurants, and shopping centres in Kampala, as in other African cities, passing through
areas of considerable deprivation to reach their destinations. In Uganda, average income is
715 USD per annum and 33.2% of the population live below the poverty line of 1.90 USD
per day (2011 PPP).1 In contrast, in the cafes where our experiment was conducted with
“wealthy” urban participants, a cup of coffee costs on average 2 USD, which is not dissimilar
to the price in US and European coffee shops, where average incomes are much higher.
Einolf (2016) explores cross-cultural differences in charitable giving using survey data.
He finds little difference in the value that people place on helping. However, he concludes
that economic and political systems can facilitate the expression of the desire to help into
1Source: http://data.worldbank.org/country/uganda, last accessed June 30, 2016. GDP per capita data
from 2015 and poverty headcount ratio data from 2012.
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formal charitable giving. Einolf (2016) notes that the political context is important because
charitable giving is an activity that takes place within political systems, with government
policies, tax systems, levels of corruption, stability, and financial regulation affecting how
easily non-profits can organize themselves and solicit donations. Mattes (2015) also em-
phasizes how country context can mediate the behaviours and preferences of the middle
class. Bekkers and Wiepking (2011) identify eight causal factors in philanthropy. These are:
Awareness of need, which is often affected by personal experience; solicitation; costs and
benefits of donating; altruism; reputation; psychological benefits (warm glow); values (in
the choice of organization); and efficacy. Multiple motives occur within each individual and
interact with one another. This study contributes to the literature within this framework
by using the controlled experiment of a dictator game to understand a) differences between
groups and b) whether participants turn a blind eye to need in order to give less. The exper-
iment “switches off” the channels of awareness of need, solicitation, and costs and benefits
by placing all participants in the same context, thus allowing us to explore the latter motives
for giving; in particular reputation and efficacy.
In developed countries, our methodology of laboratory experiments in economics has
primarily been conducted with students. Criticism of this has led research to compare the
behaviour of students with non-student populations (see, for example, Belot et al., 2015;
Falk et al., 2013). However, to our knowledge, such a comparison has yet to be conducted
within a developing country.2 The setup of the experiment is a dictator game (DG) with
a charity recipient. To participants, we did not frame the DG as an experimental game.
Rather, we informed them that the research team was giving them a sum of money for their
participation in the research and that they could choose whether to give away none, some,
or all of the money to a third party. In the baseline treatment, participants were told that
2Several papers have compared the behaviour of students in developed countries to populations in de-
veloping countries, such as Henrich et al. (2001) and related articles, but none have compared students to
non-students within a developing country.
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the third party was a charity operating in Kampala. They received the money and made the
choice before completing a questionnaire. This design ensured that questions about poverty
and the usefulness of charities would not influence their donation decision. In a “blind eye”
treatment, outlined in detail below, participants were given the choice of whether to find out
the identity of the third party with whom they were playing the game. This treatment was
designed to parallel the experience of living amongst visible poverty, where it may be “easier”
to choose to ignore the circumstances of those around you. The aim is not to criticize the use
of student subjects, rather to compare their charitable giving decision with non-students.
We also compare the decisions of public/nonprofit and private sector workers. Besley
and Ghatak (2005) outline a theoretical model whereby workers sort themselves according
to “mission”, allowing for the role of intrinsic motivation or preferences over the work of
an organization. Serra et al. (2011) conduct a trust game with health workers in Ethiopia
and find that intrinsic (philanthropic) motivation increases the likelihood of working in the
non-profit sector. Cowley and Smith (2014) examine correlates of working in the public
sector using the World Values Survey. Their overall conclusion is that there is a positive
relationship between intrinsic motivation in many of their 51 study countries, but not all.
Uganda does not have an entry in the survey but, in nearby Ethiopia and Rwanda, the
authors do find a significant positive relationship between being a public sector employee
and measures of intrinsic motivation (agreeing that it is important to help others or being
active in charity or environmental work). Using our experimental design and by comparing
public and private sector employees, we can investigate the relationship between sector of
work and charitable giving using decisions involving real sums of money.
In addition to our standard dictator game, at the end of the survey, participants were
asked if they wanted to add any of their own money to their donation. To our knowledge,
whilst this is a fairly simple treatment, it has not previously been implemented. It is most
similar to experimental studies and surveys in which participants play a dictator game with
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income earned during the study (for example, as in Bekkers et al. (2007) and Cherry et al.
(2002)). In the setting of our modified DG with real money and a charity/NGO partner,
we do not argue that the dictator game is identical to the circumstances in which people
normally find themselves. However, the addition of this final question more closely replicates
such situations. Bardsley (2008) notes that, in everyday life, individuals may be asked on a
daily basis either to contribute money to a homeless person on the street or to donate to a
charitable organization. These situations can be seen as an individual “playing” a dictator
game with their own money. Despite almost 85 per cent of our subjects giving a positive
amount of their windfall gain to their chosen charity and almost 30 per cent of participants
giving away the full amount, only 5 per cent (or seven people in a sample of 149) chose to
give any of their own funds.
The text is organized as follows. In the next section, we review the related literature.
Section 3 describes the game design in detail and specifies the five hypotheses we test with
our experimental design. Descriptive statistics and results are presented in section 4. Section
5 concludes and outlines potential areas of future research.
2 Literature Review: Experimental Games
A growing number of experimental games have been conducted in developing countries
investigating the behaviour of the poor (Cardenas and Carpenter, 2008). However, the
better-off members of the urban population who are not living in poverty, yet live in a
developing country, have rarely been experimental subjects (with the exception of students
attending African universities (e.g. Ashraf et al., 2006).
In the dictator game, participants are given an endowment (real or in token form) and
asked to divide the amount between themselves and a third party. There is no strategic
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interaction, and thus no fear of reprisal, as the third party has no agency. Therefore, giving
a non-zero amount has been interpreted as altruism, warm-glow (impure) altruism, or the
existence of other regarding preferences, such as, inequality aversion (Fehr and Schmidt,
1999) - though this interpretation is disputed (List, 2007; Bardsley, 2008). Many variants
of the game exist. Alternative treatments have been developed with regard to the size
of the endowment, the sample of interest, real or token endowments, earned or unearned
endowments, initial allocations (giving versus taking), and the identity of the recipient.
Several authors have reviewed the numerous papers employing dictator games, including
notably Camerer (2003), Cardenas and Carpenter (2008), and Engel (2011). Engel (2011)
conducts a review and meta-study of hundreds of dictator games and calculates the average
donation by dictators across all studies as 28% of the endowment. Regarding the distribution,
36% of dictators give nothing, 16% give half, and just 5% give the full amount. Engel (2011)
also finds that when real money is used, the proportion of dictators who give away nothing
decreases and the proportion who give away everything increases significantly.
Our study takes place in Uganda and the participants are likely to be much wealthier than
those who have thus far been sampled in an African setting. Engel’s (2011) meta-analysis
finds that “Western” participants are more likely to give zero, but are also more likely to give
away everything, than participants from developing countries, though the average amount
given is not significantly different in a meta-regression. Duch and Palmer (2004) find that in
Benin, with a sample of non-students, 7.8% give nothing away in a (hypothetical) dictator
situation. Henrich et al. (2005) conduct several games including a DG across a broad range of
societies and find that in small-scale societies in Africa and Latin America (Orma in Kenya,
Hadza in Tanzania, and Tsimane in Bolivia) almost nobody offers zero and that mean offers
are much higher than in (“Western”) student studies at 31, 20, and 32 percent respectively.
Whilst most early DG research used a pool of students to recruit participants, some recent
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studies have also recruited non-students, and found that students tend to give significantly
less than non-students (Belot et al., 2015; Engel, 2011; Falk et al., 2013).
Engel (2011) in his meta-study, finds that “deserving recipients” receive considerably larger
shares of the endowment. The proportion of those who give the full amount to a charity
or an individual described as more deserving rises to 20% from almost zero and those who
keep everything reduces to 20% from just under 40%. Eckel and Grossman (1996) is the first
laboratory experiment to replace an anonymous partner with a deserving cause (a charity;
the American Red Cross) as the partner. They find that student participants are more
generous in their contributions to the charity than when paired with an anonymous peer.
The authors also find that women are more generous than men. Carpenter et al. (2008)
expanded this alternative to allow (student and non-student) participants a choice between
13 charities (participants could also choose a charity of their choice if they preferred). The
authors also find that students, on average, give less than community members, though
more than in Eckel and Grossman (1996). Community members wrote down their own
charity more often than students (interpreted as possibly indicating stronger preferences
for charities) and 40% of participants allocated the full amount to the charity (100 USD).
Fong and Luttmer (2011) find that perceived worthiness of the recipients does significantly
increase giving to the charity. Small et al. (2007) summarize the evidence demonstrating
that people tend to donate more to ‘identifiable victims’ (i.e. an example of a specific person
who would be affected by the donation) rather than statistical victims (e.g. 10,000 people
die of X per year). They show that a treatment alerting participants to such heuristic biases
does reduce the amount given to the identifiable victims but does not increase the amount
given to statistical victims, resulting in an overall reduction in giving. Banuri and Keefer
(2015) find evidence of pro-social motivation increasing giving in charity dictator games for
civil servants in Indonesia.
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A multitude of studies have found that giving in dictator games appear to show people as
more altruistic than in everyday life. Bardsley (2008) makes the point that“(s)ince we all face
the dictator game all day, every day, it could be argued, the experimental design would appear
to score highly on conventional standards of ex-ante external validity”(p.123). Levitt and
List (2007) however outline five crucial peculiarities of laboratory experiments that may lead
pro-social behaviour to be significantly different from ‘real life’ behaviour. “1) the presence
of moral and ethical considerations; 2) the nature and extent of scrutiny of one’s actions by
others; 3) the context in which the decision is embedded; 4) self-selection of the individuals
making the decisions; and 5) the stakes of the game.” (p.154). Carlsson et al. (2013) also find
other differences between lab and field behaviour, interpreting it as the importance of the
environment in determining choices. Our experiment includes an unearned endowment and
the additional possibility of giving one’s own funds. This possibility is similar to an earned
endowment though not precisely the same. Though these are important considerations, we
do not see any reason to think that any of these peculiarities would have differential impacts
on our three subject types or the two treatment groups.
Finally, “experimenter demand” effects may lead subjects to contribute more in an ex-
perimental setting because they believe that this is what they are supposed to do or because
they want to please the experimenter (Carpenter et al., 2008). Both List (2007) and Bardsley
(2008) argue that the generosity observed in dictator games may be an artefact of experi-
mentation. Both authors construct treatments which allow dictators to take money away
from their partner and show that this leads to a reduction in giving. Zizzo (2013) criticizes
dictator games as being uninformative about altruistic preferences, due among other reasons,
to their being easily influenced by such things as framing and experimenter demand effects.
In our set-up (described in section 3), the experimenters were three white females aged
30-45, so there is a strong possibility that this may lead to an increase in average giving
(Cilliers et al., 2013). Though we compare the average amount donated in our experiment
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to the existing literature, this is is not the primary focus of study. We are interested in
between-subject behaviour and the impact of a randomly assigned sub-treatment. We argue
that experimenter demand effects are unlikely to explain the differences in between-subject
behaviour observed in our study. The random nature of the treatment also limits the possible
impacts of experimenter demand effects. Cilliers et al. (2013) vary foreigner presence when
conducting behavioural games in Sierra Leone. They find that the presence of a white
foreigner increases contributions in a dictator game. Moreover, the impact of the foreigner
presence is smallest among participants where the perceived power differential between the
player and the experimenter is smallest. Therefore, if similar experimenter demand effects
are present in our study, we would expect them to be smallest for our “wealthy” urban
participants, and either no different between the Ministry of Finance personnel and the
university students, or, if anything, smaller for the civil servants. This would mean that our
estimates would if anything underestimate the differential effects between subject types.
In our treatment, we aim to test the idea that some wealthy individuals who live in an
environment where they are surrounded by substantial poverty, including begging on the
street, may be prone to the idea of “turning a blind eye” to the situation. We test whether,
when given the option of not receiving any information regarding the recipient, people simply
choose to take the money and “not think about it”. This is related to a small literature which
has offered exit options in dictator games, though not precisely the same (Dana et al., 2006;
Broberg et al., 2007; Jacobsen et al., 2011).
3 Game Design and Sample Selection
A sample of 149 participants in Kampala, Uganda participated in the study in March and
April 2013. The sample was stratified by sector and potential participants were approached
at the Ministry of Finance, the College of Business and Management Sciences at Makerere
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University, and several relatively upscale cafes in Kampala. Each potential participant was
approached by one enumerator and asked if they were willing to participate in a research
study. They were then given a one-page document briefly outlining the project. The docu-
ment was intended to provide sufficient information to enable potential participants to decide
whether they wanted to participate in the study.
The document stated that the research is part of an economic study of people living
and working (or studying) in Kampala and that the information collected was only to be
used by researchers for the purpose of academic analysis. Their participation would take
approximately 10 minutes and they would be asked to make some decisions and to complete
a short questionnaire of 2 pages. They were informed that no one, including the researchers,
would be able to see their individual responses and that they themselves would place all
of their responses in a sealed envelope. The research team would then open the envelope
together with others, so no one would be able to identify any individual answers or choices.
Moreover, the participant would not be asked for their name and no identifying information
about them would be used in the research.
Those individuals who agreed to participate in the study were randomly assigned to one
of two treatments. The first treatment is a standard dictator game played with a charity
while the second treatment introduces an additional choice by the participant which reveals
the identity of the third party with whom they are playing the game. These two treatments
are described below.
In the standard treatment, each participant is given an envelope which contains the
instructions for their participation. The instructions state that the research team is giving
them 20,000 Ugandan Shillings (UGX) for participating in the research project. At the time
of the study, 20,000 UGX was equal to approximately 8 US dollars. The 20,000 UGX was
placed in an envelope labelled “FUNDS” in 2,000 UGX bills. The instructions then state
that the participant is to decide to give none, some, or all of the 20,000 UGX to one charity
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of their choice from a list of 23 charities operating in Uganda3 listed on the back of the
instruction sheet. The charities include both local and international NGOs operating in
Uganda in sectors concerning children, poverty alleviation, human rights, or animal rights,
and include both religious and non-religious organizations. Participants placed the amount
of money they wished to keep for themselves in the envelope labelled “TAKE WITH YOU”
which they took with them at the end of the activity, regardless of whether they had kept
any money for themselves. Participants also placed the amount of money they wished to give
to the charity in the envelope labelled “LEAVE WITH RESEARCH TEAM” and returned
it to the research team, regardless of whether they gave any money to a charity, along with
the instructions and the completed questionnaire.
In, what we will refer to as, the “identity” treatment, participants were given the same
instructions as those in the standard treatment. However, instead of choosing between
keeping the money for themselves and giving it to a charity of their choice, the instructions
stated that they were to decide to give none, some, or all to a third party. They were
also given the option of finding out the identity of the third party, at no cost, by opening an
envelope labelled “IDENTITY”. If the participant chose to open the “IDENTITY” envelope,
the instructions stated that the third party was a charity of their choice from the same list of
23 charities as in the standard treatment. The instructions also stated that even if they chose
to open the “IDENTITY” envelope, they were under no obligation to give away any of the
20,000 UGX. This treatment was included in order to analyze the idea that some individuals
“turn a blind eye” to the poverty surrounding them by ignoring the problem. Therefore,
our hypothesis is that individuals who received the “IDENTITY” treatment would give, on
average, less to the charity than those who received the standard treatment. We also analyze
the characteristics of individuals who choose to open the “IDENTITY” envelope, compared
3The 23 charities were chosen based on previous research conducted by the authors in Kampala. In that
study, participants were asked to choose a charity to which they wanted to donate project funds. The 23
most popular charities were included here.
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to those who do not.
After making their decisions regarding the distribution of the 20,000 UGX, participants
completed a brief questionnaire regarding their socio-economic characteristics as well as
their attitudes regarding the general performance of charities/non-governmental organiza-
tions in Uganda. In addition, those individuals who were randomly assigned to the standard
treatment, as well as those who opened the “IDENTITY” envelope, were asked questions
regarding their choice of charity. A final question asked participants if they wished to add
their own money to the amount already placed in the envelope for the charity. If they chose
to do so, they were asked to include this money with the questionnaire when they returned
the envelope containing all of the project documents. This additional question was included
to investigate one of the puzzles of dictator games; that people are generally more gener-
ous/altruistic in such games than they appear to be in everyday life. One of the proposed
explanations for this finding, noted above (Bardsley, 2008), is that such dictator games rely
on individual choices over a windfall gain and not over their own money. This additional
question is relevant only for those participants who chose to give the entire 20,000 UGX to
a charity.
With this experimental set-up, we test the following hypotheses concerning behaviour:
Hypothesis 1: The provision of an “exit option” will decrease the amount donated.
Hypothesis 2: Allowing the amount given to exceed the endowment will increase the amount
donated.
Hypothesis 3: An individual’s ranking of the charity will be positively correlated with the
amount donated.
Hypothesis 4: The amount donated will be increasing in the perceived ‘worthiness’ of the
recipient.
To our knowledge, hypothesis 2 has not been directly tested previously. The most closely
related concept is games in which subjects “earn” real money in a task and then play a
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dictator game (e.g. Small and Loewenstein, 2003, where participants complete a survey to
earn 5 USD and then play a dictator game). Such studies find that giving is significantly
reduced when the endowment is earned (see also literature review above). In related work,
Clark (2002) asks participants to bring their own money to an experimental session, and
Harrison (2007) shows in an analysis of this data that, in a public goods game, participants
do change their behaviour when playing with their own money.
To test hypotheses 3 and 4, we use information from the post-game questionnaire related
to charitable giving and the worthiness of recipients. We asked all respondents if they agreed
or disagreed (and how strongly) with the following statements. Firstly, that “NGOs are doing
good work in Uganda.”. In addition, for those respondents who played our standard dictator
game and those in the “identity” treatment group who chose to find out the identity of their
partner, we asked “On a scale from 1-10 where 1 is very poor and 10 is excellent, how
would you rate this charity?”. The quality of a charity can be learned by experience with
the charity, either directly or indirectly through research on the effectiveness of the charity.
Individuals’ opinions of the quality of the charity relate directly to the benefits they foresee
from their donation. We also hypothesize that the more people agree with the statement that
“Some people are poor through no fault of their own.”, the higher the utility they receive
from donating. This statement relates to how deserving one believes recipients are of the
charity’s help (conditional on the charity being related to poverty alleviation).
We define three occupation categories in our setup: University students, those employed
in the nonprofit sector (including Ministry of Finance personnel), and those employed in
the private sector (including the self-employed). We assume that average income is lowest
for students, followed by the nonprofit sector. Those participants in the private sector, in
addition to two Ugandans and 18 non-Ugandans employed in the nonprofit sector, were
interviewed in relatively upscale cafes. Therefore, we assume that the average income level
for those from the private sector is the highest amongst our three sectors. As noted in the
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literature review, almost all studies comparing students to non-students have found them to
behave less generously in the DG. Whether this is an income effect or a “student” effect, we
would a priori expect students to give less than non-students. All of the Ministry of Finance
personnel are Ugandan, as are most of the Makerere University students, the cafe-goers
include both Ugandans and expatriates.
4 Results
4.1 Sample Characteristics by Treatment Status
Tables 1 and 2 investigate the success of the randomization of the game treatments. We
refer to those participants who were randomly assigned to play the version of the game
with the exit option as the treatment group and those who play the standard game without
the possibility of an exit option as the control group. The treatment was randomly as-
signed to participants and stratified by the location of the experiment (Ministry of Finance,
Makerere University, cafe). In addition to the data from the dictator game, participants’
socio-demographic characteristics and attitudes to NGOs in general, and to their chosen
NGO in particular, were collected. Unfortunately, of the 149 participants, 28 participants
did not fully complete the questionnaire and are, therefore, excluded from any analysis
which includes the additional covariates measuring attitudes. Given our small sample sizes,
in table 1, we, therefore, present the success of the randomization for the full sample of
participants while in table 2, we limit the sample to the sub-sample of 121 participants
who fully completed the questionnaire. Column 1 of tables 1 and 2 present the mean and
standard deviation for the full sample while column 2 (3) presents these same statistics for
the treatment (control) group. Column 4 presents the difference between the treatment and
control group means. We expect to find no statistically significant differences between the
treatment and the control group if the randomization was successful.
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Thirty-nine percent of the sample received the identity treatment (58 individuals). For
those participants who do not complete the questionnaire, the only information available
(in addition to the outcomes of the dictator game) is the location of the experiment, their
gender, nationality (Ugandan or non-Ugandan), age, and sector of activity. Overall, the
average age in the sample is relatively young (32) and education levels are relatively high
compared to the Ugandan average. The majority of participants (71%) are Ugandan. We
find no statistically significant differences between the treatment and the control group in
the location of the experiment (as expected given the stratified randomization). Of the 12
variables in table 1, the only statistically significant difference between the treatment and
control groups for the full sample is a difference in mean age of approximately three years.
In table 2, we show that there are no statistically significant differences in gender, age,
level of education, or nationality between treatment and control group participants in the
sub-sample who fully completed the questionnaire. The only imbalance in the treatment
assignment is the location of the experiment/sector of activity (which are highly correlated).
The proportion of students who were treated is slightly higher (significant at the 10% level).4
We, therefore, control for treatment (and sector or education level, though not both as they
are highly correlated) in all specifications in our investigation below.
In figure 1, we first present a histogram of the donation amounts by sector of activity
(left hand panel) for both treatments combined. Overall, the average amount donated is just
under one-half of the endowment. Moreover, we find substantial variation in the amount
donated with many participants giving either zero or 2,000 UGX and many, especially those
from the private sector, donating the full amount. As we noted above, there are more non-
Ugandans from the private sector. We, therefore, present the histogram for the Ugandan
sub-sample in the right hand panel of figure 1. There is still a clear difference in the dis-
4Students appear to have completed the questionnaire more carefully and, hence, have fewer missing
observations.
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tribution of individuals from the private sector, who give more and are much more likely to
give the full amount. The difference between the nonprofit sector and students is almost in-
distinguishable, which we formally test below. Students are more likely to give nothing than
other participants. In a t-test, students are more likely to give nothing than non-students
(in a two-sided t-test, the difference is significant at the 10% level for the full sample of both
Ugandans and non-Ugandans).
Table 3 compares the behavioural decisions from the game across the two randomly as-
signed game treatments, and overall, for the full sample of participants (panel A) and the
sub-sample who completed the questionnaire (panel B). These simple differences (without
additional control variables) in the behavioural decisions of the participants across treatment
status are initial estimates of the impact of the treatment. As expected, a very high pro-
portion of participants did give something away (over 80%) and the average donation was
close to half of the endowment. The treatment significantly reduced the amount donated, by
2,500 UGX (full sample: t-test; p=0.0559, Mann-Whitney non-parametric test; p=0.0276).
The treatment also increased the proportion of participants keeping the full amount, from
11% of the control group to 24% of the treated participants (full sample: t-test; p=0.033,
Mann-Whitney test; p=0.034). 45 of the 58 participants assigned to the treatment group
chose to open the envelope in order to find out the identity of the recipient (78%). The re-
sults are similar in the sub-sample of participants who completed the questionnaire (panel B
of table 3). The t-test for the treatment effect becomes just insignificant, though, as for the
subgroups in the full sample above, a one-tailed t-test shows a significant reduction in giving
of 2,000 UGX (p=0.084, Mann-Whitney p-value=0.088). The finding that a significantly
larger proportion of the treated group keeps the full amount remains significant (23% vs
12%). Finally, 33 of the 43 participants assigned to the treatment group and who completed
the questionnaire chose to open the identity envelope (77%).
Table 4 investigates the decisions from the game by the participant’s choice of whether or
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not to open the identity envelope. Panel A of table 4 compares participants assigned to the
treatment group between those who chose to open the identity envelope and those who chose
not to. Those participants who chose to open the envelope and learn the identity of their
partner in the game gave significantly more than those who chose not to; on average, over
6,000 UGX more. They were also more likely to give away the full amount and less likely
to keep the full amount. Panel B compares the decisions of those participants who chose to
open the envelope with the control group. As expected, we find no significant differences in
their choices in the game.
4.2 Regression Analysis
Table 5 presents the results of a regression combining the treatment and sector dummies.
Column 1 replicates the results of the first row of table 3. With the inclusion of controls
for the two sectors of non-students, with students as the excluded category, in column 2,
the estimate of the impact of the treatment does not change significantly. Participants from
the nonprofit sector do not donate significantly more than students, unlike those from the
private sector. We include a control variable for the nationality of the participant as there
are more Ugandans in both the student (77% of students in the sample are Ugandan) and
the nonprofit sector (75% of those working in the nonprofit sector are Ugandan) compared to
the private sector (of which only 57% are Ugandan) and there may be differences in wealth
between the Ugandan and non-Ugandan participants. In column 3, we include interaction
effects between the treatment and sector of activity. Though these interactions are not
significant, they are suggestive of the hypothesis that students are more sensitive to the
treatment than the non-student sample. We, therefore, conduct t-tests and Mann-Whitney
non-parametric tests for differences in means in each sector separately. As in the regression,
the two tailed test is not significant for any of the sectors. However, in a one-sided t-test
(where H1: The treatment reduces the donation amount), both students and those working
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in the nonprofit sector show reductions in giving that are almost statistically significant (at
the 11.5% level of significant for students and the 10.48% level for those in the nonprofit
sector). The Mann-Whitney test shows a statistically significant reduction in giving due to
the treatment for those participants in the nonprofit sector.
Given the differences in nationality between the sectors of activity and the likely link
between nationality and wealth (in our sample of participants), in table 6 we present the
results of the same estimations as those in table 5 for the sub-sample of Ugandans only.
Qualitatively, the results presented in table 5 for the full sample hold for the Ugandan sub-
sample. The treatment variable loses its statistical significance in columns 1 and 2 but the
magnitude of the estimated coefficients are largely unchanged.
In table 7, we include further participant characteristics in our regression analysis. As
previously noted, this reduces our sample size to 121 participants. In column 1, we include
gender and age to our initial specification (table 5). The treatment and private sector
variables are no longer significant. In column 2, we investigate differences in the amount
donated within each sector of activity between Ugandans and non-Ugandans. We do this
by including an interaction between being Ugandan and being in the nonprofit sector and
between being Ugandan and being in the private sector5. Ugandans in the nonprofit sector
(54 out of 55 of those who completed the questionnaire work for the Ministry of Finance) give
significantly less, than students even, with a point estimate of over 11,000 UGX (column 2).
Non-Ugandans in the nonprofit sector give significantly more than students, by over 7,000
UGX while non-Ugandan participants in the private sector also give more than 6,000 UGX
more than students though this result is not statistically significant.
In columns 3 through 5, we examine correlations between the amount given and the
responses to the questions regarding social attitudes. People were asked if they agree with
5We do not include an interaction between student and being Ugandan as only 7 of 37 students are
non-Ugandan.
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the statement “People are poor through no fault of their own” on a Likert scale from 1-5; a
measure of the deservingness of the poor (as discussed above). The distribution of responses
is presented in figure 2 (left hand panel). Non-Ugandans are much more likely to agree
with the statement than Ugandans with nearly 60% strongly agreeing with the statement.
Very few participants, both Ugandan and non, disagree with the statement. We, therefore,
create a dummy variable for strongly agree (5 on the Likert scale) and include this in the
regression in column 3. The coefficient is positive and statistically significant at the 10%
level, suggesting an average increase in giving of just under 3,000 UGX.
Individuals were also asked, on a Likert scale from 1-5, if NGOs were doing good work
in Uganda. Figure 2 (right hand panel) shows the distribution of responses by nationality.
Opinions are very positive regarding NGO work, especially among Ugandans. More than
70% of respondents either agree or strongly agree with the statement, with Ugandans being
more likely to agree or strongly agree. Table 7, column 3, shows that strongly agreeing that
NGOs do good work in Uganda is negatively correlated with giving. We include an interaction
between this variable and Ugandan in column 4. This shows the negative relationship as
significant for non-Ugandans and much smaller and only weakly significant (at the 10% level)
for Ugandans. However, in column 5 when we control for education, the effect disappears
for Ugandans. The negative relationship holds for non-Ugandans only.
One possible explanation for this finding is that individuals who believe that NGOs are
doing good work in Uganda also believe that are able to do good work because they are
already well funding and, therefore, donate less. Similarly, individuals who believe that
NGOs are not doing good work may do so because they believe that they are not well
funded, and therefore, give more in our experiment. Either of these statements, or both, can
explain these seemingly counter-intuitive results. Unfortunately, we did not collect data on
the beliefs of participants regarding the funding adequacy of NGOs in Uganda.
Finally, participants in the control group and those who opened the identity envelope
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in the treatment group were asked to rank the NGO that they personally chose on a scale
from 1 (very poor) to 10 (excellent). We include this ranking in a regression of the amount
donated. The sample size drops due to the participants in the treatment group who chose
to not open the envelope, but the ranking of the NGO is not a significant determinant of
the amount given (results available upon request).
In table 3, in the simple comparison between the treatment and control groups, we find
a significant treatment effect on whether participants kept the full amount (gave nothing).
We investigate this further in tables 8 (full sample) and 9 (sub-sample who completed the
questionnaire). We then briefly discuss the characteristics of those participants who gave
the full endowment and, in addition, gave some of their own money.
In table 8, we present linear probability model results where the dependent variable is a
dummy variable which equals one if the participant kept all of the money for themselves and
zero otherwise.6 In columns 2 and 3, we include an interaction term between the treatment
and sector of activity status allowing for the impact of the treatment to vary between the
participants from the three sectors.
In column 1, we show that the treatment is statistically significant and increases the like-
lihood of keeping the full amount by 0.13 for the omitted category of students. In columns 2
and 3, the interaction terms between the treatment and the sectors of activity are not statis-
tically significant. However, their inclusion increases the magnitude of the simple treatment
variable to 0.22/0.23. Though, the interaction terms are not statistically significant at con-
ventional levels, implying the impact of the treatment does not differ by sector of activity,
both estimated coefficients are negative with the magnitude of the interaction between the
treatment and the private sector equal to that of the treatment alone. However, we find that
the total impact of the treatment for both participants from the nonprofit sector and those
6In robustness checks, we estimate both probit and logit models, and find similar results. We present the
linear probability model results as it facilitates the interpretation of the interaction terms.
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from the private sector is not significantly different from zero (in both columns 2 and 3).
Therefore, the increase in the probability of keeping the full amount due to the treatment is
only statistically significant for students.
In addition to these regression results, we conduct significance tests for the treatment,
for each sector separately, and find that there is no significant treatment effect for those
participants from the private sector, confirming the findings in table 8. For students, the
two tailed t-test and the Mann-Whitney test are insignificant, but the one-sided p-value of
the treatment effect (H1: The treatment effect is positive) is significant at the 10% level
(p=0.0758). The results are similar for those participants from the nonprofit sector with
both a two tailed t-test and a Mann-Whitney test for a non-zero treatment effect being
insignificant, but the one-sided p-value of the treatment effect is significant at the 10% level
(p=0.0627). In column 3, we add controls for age, gender, and nationality, and find that the
treatment results are broadly unchanged. We also find that women are less likely to keep
the full amount.
In table 9, we control for age, gender, nationality, education, and also include the same
set of questions on attitudes to NGOs and poverty, as for the donation regressions in table
7. Female participants are again less likely to give nothing away. Attitudes towards poverty
and NGO performance are not significantly related to whether a participant chose to keep
the full endowment.
Having examined the determinants of keeping the full amount, we now turn to a brief
discussion of those individuals who gave their own money to their chosen charity. Recall
that the final question of the questionnaire asked participants if they wanted to add some
of their own money to that which they had allocated from their endowment. Only seven
individuals, or 16% of those who donated the full endowment (4.7% of the total sample),
chose to do so. Given this small sample, we are unable to examine the correlates of giving of
these additional funds econometrically. Nonetheless, this is an interesting finding in itself,
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indicating that people who are “generous” by giving away all of the windfall gain allocated
to them in an economic experiment are more generous with such an endowment than with
their own money. However, we cannot exclude the possibility that participants felt that
20,000 UGX was already sufficient to give to an NGO. Of the seven individuals who gave
their own funds, six were male, six were Ugandan (the one female who contributed her own
funds was not Ugandan). No students gave their own funds, and only one civil servant from
the Ministry of Finance did so. The significance of these characteristics cannot be tested
given the few positive observations of own contributions, but do seem to reflect the findings
of the donation regressions presented above.
5 Conclusions
We play a modified dictator game in urban Uganda with the partner being a charity op-
erating locally. Our subjects include university students and non-students who participated
either at the Ministry of Finance or in a cafe in Kampala. The average donation amount
is just under one-half of the endowment; somewhat higher than has been found elsewhere
in the literature. This result is unsurprising given the the “worthiness” of the recipient, a
charity.
Our experimental design allowed us to test four hypotheses concerning behaviour. Our
first hypothesis, that the provision of an “exit option” should decrease the amount donated,
is not rejected in the simple means tests. However, the treatment becomes insignificant when
controlling for group differences and individual characteristics. Given our small sample size
and the minor changes in the magnitudes of the coefficients of interest, this is likely due to
a lack of power.
Allowing the amount given to exceed the endowment was hypothesized to increase the
amount donated. Despite 30% of participants donating their full endowment to the charity,
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only seven participants, 4.7% of the total sample, added their own funds to the amount they
chose to donate from the unearned endowment. This result may indicate that participants
felt that 20,000 UGX was a sufficient donation amount or that they treated the “windfall”
endowment in the game differently from their own income, or both.
Furthermore, our results suggest, that an individual’s ranking of the charity is negatively
correlated with the amount given for non-Ugandans. We suggest one possible explanation
for this counter-intuitive finding. Individuals who believe that NGOs are doing good work
in Uganda may believe that they are able to do so because they are already well funded.
Similarly, individuals who believe that NGOs are not doing good work in Uganda may do
so because they believe they do not have sufficient funding. Unfortunately, we do not have
data to test this explanation. We do not find strong evidence supporting the hypothesis, that
the amount given is increasing in the perceived ‘worthiness’ of the recipient. A participant
agreeing with the statement that “People are poor through no fault of their own” did not
donate significantly more, in a regression with individual controls.
Earnings amongst our participants are likely lowest for students, so we might expect this
subgroup to donate the least (in line with the findings of many other studies). However, we
find that civil servants are significantly less generous than students, donating 3,000 UGX less,
or approximately 30% of the average donation amount. This is in contrast with the findings
of Banuri and Keefer (2015), who find civil servants to be more generous. Interestingly,
the students who participated in our game were students in the economics department at
Makerere University, which is where many of the personnel within the Ministry of Finance
studied. Therefore, expected lifetime earnings are plausibly similar for students and Ministry
of Finance personnel and are also unlikely to explain the differential findings. One possible
explanation is that the Ministry of Finance personnel are more likely to be expected to
financially assist others in their extended families and social networks compared to students
(Jakiela and Ozier, 2012). It is possible that Ministry of Finance personnel, and others,
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chose to use the funds they kept from the game to assist members of their network instead
of a charity. Finally, other non-students, likely our wealthiest subgroup, show the opposite
behaviour, being more generous in their giving to charities.
Our results provide some modest evidence that non-poor people in a developing country
do give fairly generously to charity when given the option from a windfall gain, though they
are much less likely to give from their own purses, and less likely to give when they have an
option not to see the person in need. These findings suggest interesting areas of future re-
search. One extension would be to vary the amount of the endowment in order to investigate
whether participants did not contribute their own funds because of the belief that the full
endowment was sufficient funding for the charity. Moreover, a larger sample size and detailed
participant attitudes towards NGOs, including the adequacy of their funding, would shed
further light on this issue and would allow for additional exploration of behavioural differ-
ences between these interesting and understudied sub-populations in developing countries.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics by Treatment Status (Full Sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full Sample Treatment Group Control Group Difference
Makerere University 0.26 0.33 0.21 0.12
(0.44) (0.47) (0.41)
Ministry of Finance 0.36 0.34 0.37 -0.03
(0.48) (0.48) (0.49)
Cafe 0.38 0.33 0.42 -0.09
(0.49) (0.47) (0.50)
Female 0.46 0.50 0.43 0.07
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Ugandan 0.71 0.72 0.70 0.02
(0.46) (0.45) (0.46)
Age 32.14 30.02 33.47 -3.45**
(10.12) (8.82) (10.69)
Completed High School or Less 0.35 0.31 0.37 -0.06
(0.48) (0.47) (0.49)
Undergraduate Degree 0.43 0.50 0.38 0.12
(0.50) (0.50) (0.49)
Postgraduate Degree 0.21 0.19 0.23 -0.04
(0.41) (0.40) (0.42)
Nonprofit Sector 0.50 0.41 0.55 -0.14
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Private Sector 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.01
(0.43) (0.43) (0.43)
Student 0.27 0.34 0.22 0.12
(0.45) (0.48) (0.42)
Observations 149 58 91
Notes: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics by Treatment Status (Complete Questionnaire Sub-Sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full Sample Treatment Group Control Group Difference
Makerere University 0.27 0.37 0.22 0.15*
(0.45) (0.49) (0.42)
Ministry of Finance 0.33 0.28 0.36 -0.08
(0.47) (0.45) (0.48)
Cafe 0.40 0.35 0.42 -0.07
(0.49) (0.48) (0.50)
Female 0.40 0.44 0.38 0.06
(0.49) (0.50) (0.49)
Ugandan 0.69 0.67 0.69 -0.02
(0.47) (0.47) (0.46)
Age 32.18 30.44 33.14 -2.70
(10.16) (9.40) (10.49)
Completed High School or Less 0.31 0.28 0.33 -0.05
(0.47) (0.45) (0.47)
Undergraduate Degree 0.46 0.51 0.44 0.08
(0.50) (0.51) (0.50)
Postgraduate Degree 0.22 0.21 0.23 -0.02
(0.42) (0.41) (0.42)
Nonprofit Sector 0.49 0.37 0.55 -0.18*
(0.50) (0.49) (0.50)
Private Sector 0.24 0.23 0.24 -0.01
(0.43) (0.43) (0.43)
Student 0.28 0.40 0.22 0.18**
(0.45) (0.49) (0.42)
Observations 121 43 78
Notes: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
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Table 3: Game Decisions by Treatment Status
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full Sample Treatment Group Control Group Difference
Panel A
Amount Donated 9,114.09 7,568.97 10,098.90 -2,529.94*
(7,886.47) (7,793.64) (7,828.80)
Gave Away Full Amount 0.30 0.22 0.34 -0.12
(0.46) (0.42) (0.48)
Kept Full Amount 0.16 0.24 0.11 0.13**
(0.37) (0.43) (0.31)
Opened Envelope 0.78
Observations 149 58 91
Panel B
Amount Donated 9,297.52 8,093.02 9,961.54 -1,868.52
(8,015.24) (8,129.35) (7,925.70)
Gave Away Full Amount 0.31 0.26 0.35 -0.09
(0.47) (0.44) (0.48)
Kept Full Amount 0.16 0.23 0.12 0.12*
(0.37) (0.43) (0.32)
Opened Envelope 0.77
Observations 121 43 78
Notes: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
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Table 4: Game Decisions by Envelope Choice
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment Sample Did Not Open Opened Difference
Panel A
Amount Donated 7,568.97 2,615.38 9,000.00 -6,384.62***
(7,793.64) (4,426.03) (8,000.00)
Gave Away Full Amount 0.22 0.00 0.29 -0.29**
(0.42) (0.00) (0.46)
Kept Full Amount 0.24 0.54 0.16 0.38***
(0.43) (0.52) (0.37)
Observations 58 13 45
Panel B
Identity Sample Opened Control Difference
Amount Donated 9,735.29 9,000.00 10,098.90 -1,098.90
(7,873.29) (8,000.00) (7,828.80)
Gave Away Full amount 0.32 0.29 0.34 -0.05
(0.47) (0.46) (0.48)
Kept Full Amount 0.13 0.16 0.11 0.05
(0.33) (0.37) (0.31)
Observations 136 45 91
Notes: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
The identity sample is composed of the control group and those participants in the
treatment group who chose to open the identity envelope.
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Table 5: Impact of Treatment by Sector
(1) (2) (3)
Treatment -2,529.94* -2,303.11* -2,975.30
(1,310.87) (1,235.93) (2,340.93)
Nonprofit Sector 636.94 106.71
(1,414.64) (1,908.10)








Constant 10,098.90*** 11,849.18*** 12,253.01***
(821.69) (1,862.86) (2,141.49)
R2 0.02 0.17 0.17
Sample Size 149 146 146
Notes: Dependent variable is the amount donated (UGX).
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
Table 6: Impact of Treatment by Sector (Ugandan Sub-Sample)
(1) (2) (3)
Treatment -2,150.79 -2,083.29 -1,666.67
(1,378.88) (1,322.68) (2,353.78)
Nonprofit Sector -1,359.84 -885.71
(1,427.55) (1,986.05)






Constant 8,365.08*** 8,208.31*** 8,000.00***
(890.09) (1,350.91) (1,692.92)
R2 0.02 0.12 0.12
Sample Size 105 105 105
Notes: Dependent variable is the amount donated (UGX).
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
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Table 7: Personal Characteristics Correlated with Amount Donated
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)








Ugandan -4,781.78*** 2,193.55 -3,500.83** -5,857.99** -5,654.98**
(1,616.80) (3,272.72) (1,572.43) (2,308.67) (2,435.03)
Female 1,597.73 895.79 668.93 547.41 503.70
(1,378.54) (1,340.32) (1,333.38) (1,305.53) (1,274.46)
Age 137.56* 221.02*** 124.59* 88.80 52.62
(77.55) (83.99) (62.90) (64.93) (68.47)
Treatment -1,736.37 -1,094.86 -1,148.62 -1,502.26 -1,598.93
(1,404.72) (1,274.76) (1,394.69) (1,347.00) (1,295.43)
People poor no fault 2,766.82* 2,422.22 414.94
(Strongly Agree) (1,566.21) (2,275.81) (2,703.35)
People poor no fault 196.95 1,597.72
(Strongly Agree)*Ugandan (3,036.93) (3,122.40)
NGOs Do Good -4,542.88*** -9,998.04*** -8,235.56***
(Strongly Agree) (1,363.19) (2,562.15) (2,633.60)






Constant 7,511.20** -55.49 8,594.68*** 11,460.27*** 11,295.30***
(3,016.63) (3,603.86) (2,747.66) (3,311.49) (3,844.81)
R2 0.19 0.27 0.23 0.27 0.32
Sample Size 121 121 119 119 119
Notes: Dependent variable is the amount donated (UGX). * significant at 10%,
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10% ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
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Table 8: LPM Estimates of Keeping the Full Amount by Sector (Full Sample)
(1) (2) (3)
Nonprofit Sector -0.09 -0.04 0.03
(0.08) (0.08) (0.09)
Private Sector -0.10 0.01 0.01
(0.09) (0.11) (0.12)
Treatment 0.13* 0.23* 0.22*
(0.07) (0.13) (0.13)
Treatment*Nonprofit Sector -0.09 -0.11
(0.16) (0.16)






Ugandan -0.10 -0.10 -0.09
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Constant 0.25** 0.19* 0.43***
(0.10) (0.10) (0.13)
R2 0.06 0.07 0.12
Sample Size 146 146 143
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant
at 1%. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 9: LPM Estimates of Keeping the Full Amount (Sub-Sample with Additional Controls)
(1) (2) (3)
Non-Ugandan 0.05 0.07 0.02
(0.07) (0.08) (0.12)
Female -0.15** -0.17** -0.15**
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
Age -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.00**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Treatment 0.09 0.09 0.10
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
People poor no fault -0.01 0.03
(Strongly Agree) (0.07) (0.10)
People poor no fault -0.05
(Strongly Agree) * Non-Ugandan (0.17)
NGOs Do Good (Strongly Agree) 0.11 0.01
(0.07) (0.09)






Constant 0.40*** 0.35*** 0.30**
(0.11) (0.11) (0.13)
R2 0.09 0.11 0.14
Sample Size 122 120 120
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant
at 1%. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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